

CONSTRUCTING TRANSNATIONAL ISLAM

The East–West network of Shakib Arslan

Raja Adal

The interwar period saw the division of the greater part of the world into a colonized East and a colonizing West, and within the East into partly overlapping Arab and Islamic worlds. The East, the West, the Arab world, the Islamic world, each had its human networks. At the same time, the very concepts of an Arab world and of an Islamic world competed with local nationalisms, with Westernization, and with each other. As a literary figure belonging to the cultural milieus of Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus, and as the Arab *amīr al bayān*, “the prince of eloquence,” Shakib Arslan was strongly connected to the Arab world. As a former student of Muhammad ‘Abduh, a close friend of Rashid Rida, and an important contributor to the journal *al-Manār*, he was a spokesman for the Islamic revival. As a resident of Switzerland, the publisher of the journal *La Nation Arabe*, and a perpetual anticolonial activist, he was a regular figure at anticolonial congresses and in Paris, Berlin, and Rome.

During the entire interwar period, Shakib Arslan’s position at the crossroad of various regions and worldviews gave him influence throughout an extensive region that stretched from the Arabian Gulf states and the Arab East, through Western and Eastern Europe, and to the Maghreb. At the same time, Arslan was “arguably the most widely read Arab writer of the interwar period,”¹ and the Egyptian press diffused his lifetime production of more than 2,000 articles and 20 volumes throughout the Arab and Islamic world. In French, his journal *La Nation Arabe* allowed him to reach Arab students with a Western education, non-Arab Muslims who did not know Arabic, Western policy makers, and anti-colonial activists, introducing concepts of the Arab world and the Islamic revival to new audiences.

This chapter traces the members of Arslan’s transnational network, looks into the manner that it was constructed, and ultimately asks for its *raisons d’être*, for the reasons that drove it into being. It does so through a systematic analysis of the thousands of proper names that appear throughout the 2,437 pages and 38 volumes

of *La Nation Arabe*. This approach made it possible to unearth pertinent passages scattered throughout the text and overlooked by previous studies of Shakib Arslan, which have only made cursory use of the journal.² More importantly, systematic indexing allowed the text itself to provide the key figures which were the pillars of Arslan's transnational network, and upon which the framework of this article is based.³

Its structure is based upon a spatial division of Shakib Arslan's network into regions. After a brief introduction on Arslan himself, it begins with his connections to the highest echelons of the Ottoman state at the time of the dissolution of the Empire, and with the networks and plans of the exiled community in the first few years of the interwar period. The second section returns to the links geographically closest to Arslan's birthplace in the mountains of Lebanon, to the land that lay between those mountains and Istanbul, namely to the intellectual milieu of Damascus and Beirut. From the last days of the First World War and until 1937 Shakib Arslan was an exiled nationalist leader, and it is testimony to the intellectual influence that he exercised from afar if after a twenty-year absence he received a hero's welcome in Beirut and Damascus. The third part is about Europe, where Arslan published *La Nation Arabe*, collaborated with the leadership of European anticolonial movements, organized the European Muslim Congress, and strove to maintain ties between Eastern Europe and the other centers of the Islamic world.

A fourth section describes how, to the largely independent Arab and Muslim states of Ibn Saud in the Hijaz and Nejd, of Imam Yahya in Yemen, and of Faisal in Iraq, Arslan offered his services for council and, when necessary, mediation, engaging in the difficult task of drawing the three monarchs toward greater Arab unity. While the situation in the Arab East was complex and highly politicized, fraught with the rivalry of the Husaynis and Nashashibis in Palestine, with that of the independent kingdoms of the Hijaz-Nejd, Yemen, and Iraq, and with the aggressive factionalism of the Syrian independence movement, the Maghreb provided a welcome respite. A fifth section deals with how Arslan came to be known as the protector, strategist, and mastermind of the Maghreb's independence movements, mobilizing the Islamic world for such causes as the repeal of the Berber Dahir. This, in turn, gave the leaders of North African independence movements studying in Paris a new sense of pan-Arab and pan-Islamic consciousness. The sixth section concerns Arslan's close links with the intellectual world of Cairo, which printed Arslan's works and diffused them throughout the Arab world. Yet it so happens that, as the country where 'Abduh and Rida lived, Arslan's Egyptian network becomes most relevant when studied in the context of the Islamic revival and irrespective of geographic location, and so the last section will be about "the Manarists."

Shakib Arslan was born to one of two families that have traditionally assumed the leadership of Mount Lebanon's Druze community, a heterodox sect of Isma'ili

Islam. It is unknown when and how he entered the mainstream of Sunni Islam, later to become one of its chief publicizers, but at the age of 16 he was strongly influenced by classes taught at the Madrasat al-Sultaniyya by Muhammad ‘Abduh, who was exiled in Beirut. For his whole life, he remained a follower of ‘Abduh’s Islamic reformist movement and a member of ‘Abduh’s political and literary circles.

Druze on his father’s side and by inheritance, Arslan’s mother, as well as his wife, were Circassian, a Muslim minority group from the Caucasus. It is revealing of Arslan’s Ottoman background that, although an emblematic figure of interwar pan-Arabism and pan-Islam, he was originally born a member of a heretic sect not considered Islamic by the majority of Sunnis, was ethnically half non-Arab, and eventually married a foreign immigrant of non-Arab origin. Although his wife Salima had lived in the region of Salt in north Jordan since her childhood, she testifies to only knowing Turkish at the time of their marriage.⁴

Arslan received a modern education, first at an American protestant school, then at the Maronite Christian Madrasat al-Hikma (also known by its French appellation *La Sagesse*), and finally at the Ottoman Madrasat al-Sultaniyya. In the course of his education he learned French, Ottoman Turkish, some English, and quickly distinguished himself as a singularly gifted writer of Arabic. For the rest of his life, and to this day, the Arab world knows him as “*amīr al-bayān*,” the “prince of eloquence.” This title is significant in two ways. When the two words are taken separately the second refers to his literary genius, while the first makes reference to his title of Amir, a responsibility he first came to assume at the age of 17, when his father died and he became governor of the Shuf Mountains in south central Lebanon. Although Arslan would eventually leave the confines of Lebanese Mountain politics, throughout his life he would remain a prodigious writer and a natural political leader.

While Arslan published extensively in Arabic, the one journal that he edited himself was in French. Printed in the vicinity of Geneva and mostly edited with his colleague Ihsan al-Jabiri, *La Nation Arabe* appeared from 1930 to 1938 in thirty-eight volumes.⁵ It is interesting to compare *La Nation Arabe* and *al-Manār*, in that Arslan and Rida shared an exceptionally close friendship and were proponents of very similar visions of the Islamic revival movement, both belonging to the school of Muhammad ‘Abduh. Many of the articles that Arslan wrote for *La Nation Arabe* he rewrote in Arabic and addressed them to *al-Manār*’s readers after making slight changes to accommodate the different readership. Although published in French and Arabic respectively, and addressed to different, although overlapping, audiences, the two journals can often be seen sharing the same source. *Al-Manār* operated in the context of Islam as a contemporary religion while *La Nation Arabe* was a “political, literary, economic, and social journal” operating in the contemporary world approached from an Islamic perspective. In other respects, Arslan differed from Rashid Rida. Their difference is illustrated by the one time the two friends were at odds. It was in

1915, at a time when Arab nationalists, including Rida, were earnestly beginning to oppose the Ottoman state. Arslan, as a member of the Ottoman parliament, and more importantly as one raised in the context of its multi-ethnic, multi-lingual cosmopolitanism, could not imagine Arabs separated from Turks embarking alone upon their political destiny. Deceivingly entitled *La Nation Arabe*, Arslan's journal dealt as much with the Arab world as with the non-Arab regions of the Islamic world.

The Ottoman world, its loss, and the endeavor to restore it

Born in nineteenth-century Mount Lebanon and schooled in an Ottoman civil service school, Shakib Arslan's adoption of the reformist Islamic themes taught by Muhammad 'Abduh in Beirut only strengthened his attachment to a multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire, seat of the Caliphate and barrier against foreign encroachment. His enthusiasm for the empire is perhaps most clearly expressed by the Ottoman campaign of 1911–1912 to preserve Cyrenaica against Italian conquest. Arslan, a Druze Amir and former *mutaşarrif* (provincial governor) of Mount Lebanon rushed to the front, spending eight months fighting with the regular Ottoman troops. The battle was lost and the empire continued shrinking, but it was there that Arslan met the young Turkish officers from the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), who would come to seize power in 1913 and draw Arslan into the innermost circles of Ottoman rule.

Among them was Enver Paşa, who along with Talat Paşa and Cemal Paşa was member of the triumvirate that held power in Istanbul from 1913 until the end of the First World War.⁶ The friendship that bound Arslan, an Arab Ottoman Amir and writer, to Enver Paşa, a Turkish Ottoman general of lower class origins, deserves closer examination. On the ideological plane, the CUP is seen by revisionist historians such as Hasan Kayali not as the logical precursor of Turkish nationalism, but only as an advocate of secular Ottoman nationalism, which the party adopted in 1908 only to abandon at the end of the Balkan wars in 1913. With the Balkan possessions lost, and the Ottoman Empire reduced to predominantly Muslim subjects, there occurred what Kayali describes as an "Islamist reinterpretation of Ottomanism." As a result "the Unionists came to rely on religion in their quest for centralization and social harmony much as their nemesis Abdulhamid had."⁷

The friendship and partnership between Enver Paşa and Shakib Arslan, however, begun in 1911 and continued until the former's death eleven years later, transcending the CUP "conversion" to Islamist politics, and the exile of both Enver and Arslan. It would be an easy answer to say that both Enver and Arslan had a vested interest in the Ottoman state and thus fought for its preservation, and subsequently for its restoration. In terms of military ventures, both can be seen engaging in lost causes, which, if not outright romantic, had very little chances of success. The conditions of Enver Paşa's death in the mountains of Eastern

Bukhara are described by Arslan in *La Nation Arabe*:

Enver Paşa, to whom I had explained all of the [hidden] intentions of Bolsheviks when they invited him to settle in Moscow by promising him wonders, soon realized that the Bolsheviks were using him to threaten the English and that, in reality, they detested him no less than they detested the English. It is then that he secretly went, disguised as a peasant, to Bukhara and chased the Russians out of this kingdom which they had subjugated and ruined. Since the fight was not equal, Enver could not hold more than one year, and died as a martyr in a battle in which, with 300 fighters he held his own against 12,000 Russian soldiers.⁸

On the political stage, Arslan and Enver Paşa would closely cooperate in the years of exile after 1917. In the meantime, after his election to the Ottoman parliament in 1913, Arslan had the much less enviable position of being one of the leading Arab Ottoman figures in Damascus during Cemal Paşa's reign of terror. Later accused of collaboration during Cemal's suppression of Arab nationalist movements, Arslan insisted that in his position as representative to the Ottoman parliament, it was his responsibility to struggle to alleviate the deportations, executions, and food shortages by negotiating with Cemal Paşa. He claims to have done this in frequent meetings with the latter, and to have had recourse to the other two members of the Ottoman triumvirate, Talat Paşa and Enver Paşa, to attempt to alleviate the famine that hit Syria and Lebanon.⁹

As for Kemal Paşa, the future Atatürk, whom Arslan first met when he was chief of staff of Enver's army, they met again at the Café Maskot in Berlin in the late summer of 1917, on the day that British troops were entering Jerusalem. Expressing his anguish at the fate of Jerusalem and Palestine, Arslan confessed to his companion his fears about the tragic situation of Islam. Kemal Paşa, who would one day become the father of the secularist Turkish nation-state, is said to have told Arslan:

We shall take it [Jerusalem] back, we shall take it back... *inshaallah* [God willing], we shall take it back; and if I say "*inshaallah*" it is as a good Muslim that I say it, because I am Muslim before all else; but it is certain that we shall take it back.¹⁰

Before becoming a secularist Turkish nationalist, and in the presence of Arslan, Kemal Paşa spoke very much like his fellow Ottoman companions, although perhaps with a more consciously expressed profession of faith.

In the immediate aftermath of the war and with the Ottoman Empire occupied, Arslan exiled himself in Berlin, along with the CUP leadership, which included Enver and Talat. In those immediate postwar years, as Allied ambitions in the former Ottoman lands became clearer, with the Balfour declaration that promised a Jewish homeland in Palestine, with the violent end brought by the French to

Faisal's independent kingdom in Syria, and before the commercial agreements of March 1921 between the Soviets and Britain had been signed, a coalition of Arabs and Turks under the banner of Islam and allied to the Soviet Union did not appear to be a completely improbable scenario. It is in this context that Enver Paşa founded the Islamic International (or Islamintern) as an extension of the CUP. Based in Moscow, Enver envisaged a decentralized organization consisting of regional cells spanning the entire Islamic world, each with its own strategy but operating within a general framework and with an overarching goal: the freedom and self-government of Islamic lands.¹¹

The long cold voyage to Moscow was not easy for the Arab and Turkish exiles who accepted the invitation. Arslan had previously been in contact with the Soviet Politburo member Zinovev in Saint Moritz in order to communicate a message from King Faisal, and met him again, along with Trotsky, in Moscow during the third general conference of the Komintern.¹² The commemorative photograph of the Islamic International Conference members shows an out of place and depressed group of Arabs and Turks, for demoralization must have been all the more complete after Talat's assassination earlier that year in Berlin. Shakib Arslan wrote Enver that the loss of Talat represented "not only a loss for the CUP, not only a loss for the Turkish people, but a loss for the whole Islamic world."¹³ Enver's death a year later marked the end of Arslan's hopes for a restoration of the empire.

While the CUP's political position changed with circumstances, adapting the ideologies of Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkish nationalism to the various conditions existing during their rise to power and subsequent downfall, a common underlying cultural background can be seen in the personal relationship between Arslan and Enver Paşa. As Kayali points out, "the Ottoman state—'sick man' though it may have been—actually had more resilience in its last decade than historians generally credit it with."¹⁴ Not only the state, but what may be called an "Ottoman culture" seems to also have embodied the ideals of men such as Shakib Arslan and Enver Paşa, and its resilience may very well have survived the demise of the empire and, as shall later be seen, its legacy found heirs in future generations.

Syria

Shakib Arslan's relationship with Syria during the interwar period, from 1917 to 1937, was that of an exile. Yet to former Ottomans like Arslan, Syria meant greater Syria and included not only the French mandates of Syria and Lebanon but also the British mandate of Palestine. It was accepted, however, that the political conditions created by the colonial powers were unavoidable, at least in the short term. The "Syrian Congress," which met in 1921 in Geneva to petition the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission, changed its name to "Syrian-Palestinian Congress" upon the request of the Palestinian delegates who contended that, their region being under British mandate, their agenda might also

have to differ.¹⁵ Shakib Arslan himself quickly realized that bargaining included compromise, and in his discussions with de Jouvenel accepted the idea of a plebiscite to determine whether Tripoli and the other regions added to Lebanon in 1920 would join a Syrian or a Lebanese independent state.¹⁶

Shakib Arslan's official position was that of head of the three member permanent delegation of the Syrian-Palestinian Congress to the League of Nations in Geneva. Although the Congress's first meeting in 1921 was unsuccessful in obtaining the League of Nations' interference in British and French mandatory policy, the idea of a permanent delegation to represent the Syrian issue to the League gained renewed urgency in the summer of 1925, when the Syrian revolt broke out. The revolt, and its violent suppression, coincided with 'Abd al-Karim's revolt in the Rif Mountains of Morocco, and for an instant it seemed as if France's colonial empire had been fragilized. It is in this context that Arslan moved to Switzerland to express the aspirations of the Syrian and Palestinian independentists to the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission and to the European world.

The delegation had three members. In addition to Shakib Arslan, there was Ihsan al-Jabiri, Arslan's partner from 1925 until his return to Syria in 1937 to become governor of the district of Latakia. Jabiri was an Arab Ottoman from a prominent family of Aleppo, who had once served as municipal leader. Educated in Istanbul and with a higher law degree from Paris, Jabiri was an aristocratic member of his world, who held several positions in the high Ottoman bureaucracy before becoming Chamberlain of King Faisal during the latter's short reign. He was, in Arslan's words, "our colleague and companion of arms in the patriotic struggle that we have together pursued in Europe, since the Syrian-Palestinian Congress held in Geneva in 1921, and until the completion of the Franco-Syrian treaty in 1937."¹⁷

The third member of the delegation was Sulayman Kin'an, a Maronite from Mount Lebanon who had been a representative in the twelve member Lebanese Administrative Council, which from 1861 to 1919 was the governing body of Mount Lebanon. In 1920 it declared the independence of Lebanon in opposition to the French Mandate, and in 1921 Kin'an was a delegate to the Syrian-Palestinian Congress, submitting a request to the League of Nations for Lebanese independence within its pre-1920 frontiers.¹⁸ In later years, Kin'an was replaced by Riyad al-Sulh, whose father Riza al-Sulh was interior minister in Faisal's cabinet at the time of the imposition of the French mandate in 1920.¹⁹ A member of Beirut's Sunni merchant bourgeoisie, Riyad al-Sulh was to become the independent Lebanese Republic's first prime minister in 1943.

Beyond the immediate associates of Shakib Arslan in Geneva, there were of course the great alliances and rivalries that characterized the fractious Syrian independence movement. Within this landscape, Arslan can be clearly positioned as the close friend, ally, and advisor of three major actors, Rashid Rida, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, and his younger brother 'Adil Arslan; and as the antagonist of two others, Michel Lutfallah and especially 'Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar.

Although vice-president of the Syrian-Palestinian Congress, one of its active participants, and a lifelong ally of Arslan, the Syrian nationalist aspect of Rashid Rida has often found itself overshadowed by his position in the Islamic revivalist movement. Yet Rida's writings in *al-Manār* bear the stamp of his ideas on Syrian unity, and of the Islamic content of his Arab and Syrian nationalism. Unlike Arslan, Rida was involved in the Arab Nationalist movement before and during the First World War, and this was the only time when the two friends were at odds. Yet with the war ended, Arslan lost the Ottoman state, which he had defended to the very end, and Rida realized that the Arab revolt had resulted not in independence but in European colonization. During Arslan's difficult period of transition from Ottomanism to Arabism, it was Rida who, in Cleveland's words, "played the major role in reintegrating Arslan with the Arab leaders who had been alienated by his wartime policies [in support of the Ottoman empire]."²⁰ Thus was Arslan elected Secretary of the Syrian-Palestinian congress, later to become its prime animator.

On the whole, Khoury is justified in stating that Palestinian delegates to the congress were wary of Syrian elements who adopted an increasingly narrow territorial form of nationalism focusing on a smaller Syria, compromising on the issue of Zionism, and attached to the Hashemites, who were suspect in Palestinian eyes.²¹ However, while this view was applicable to the Lutfallah and Shahbandar faction within the congress, the situation was different in the case of Arslan and Rida. Indeed, Khoury notes that although both Jabiri and Arslan were exiled, they were looked upon admiringly by the younger group of ultra-nationalist Istiqlalists as leaders of exemplary integrity, who were not reluctant to confront the controversy over Palestine.²² *La Nation Arabe*, the delegation's journal published by Arslan, dealt extensively with the Palestinian issue, regularly reproducing the numerous resolutions sent by the Syrian-Palestinian Congress, which by the 1930s was dominated by Arslan and his allies, to the League of Nations. As the years advance it propelled the issue to the forefront of all others, attributing to it crisis proportions. In its 8 years of publication, the journal devoted 11% of its articles including one special issue to the Palestinian question, and regularly published reports of Zionist congresses in Europe and lists of European politicians and publications with their stance upon the issue, while calling for Arabs and Muslims to unite.

In that section of the Arab world referred to as Palestine, Arslan was closely allied to Hajj Amin al-Husayni, Mufti of Jerusalem, and President of the Supreme Muslim Council of Palestine. The Mufti of Jerusalem held a traditional role in a traditional Arab-Muslim world, that suddenly found itself faced with powerful international pressures. The rapid succession of events beginning with the First World War and the Arab revolt, the end of the Ottoman Empire and the coming of the British, the sudden separation from other parts of Syria and the alarming increase in Jewish immigration, entailed a drastically new brand of political action. For assistance in such matters, from the 1920s until the end of the Second World War, the Mufti turned to Arslan. By 1935, Arslan had written to the Mufti

more than 100 letters, and in the next 10 years it is probable that Arslan's stream of letters and advice increased.²³ In 1936, when David Ben Gurion, one of the leaders of the Zionist Executive and the future first Prime Minister of Israel, sought to make an agreement with Arab leaders, it was Shakib Arslan and Ihsan al-Jabiri whom he visited in the former's home in Geneva. Ben Gurion had been in contact with an Arab interlocutor, Musa 'Alami, who told him that the main leader with decisive power in Palestine was the Mufti, and that the Mufti paid attention to the views of the Istiqlalist leaders outside of "Palestine," and especially to those of Arslan and Jabiri: "It was Musa Alami's opinion that I [Ben Gurion] should first of all meet Jabri and Arslan. He would write to them about his talk with the Mufti. The Mufti attached much weight to their opinion, and they to his."²⁴

Arslan and the Mufti both vigorously opposed British and French colonization in the Arab and Islamic world. In an attempt to gain leverage against the British and French, they set about finding European allies willing to oppose British and French hegemony, and in Europe the counterweights to Britain and France were Italy and Germany. In Palestine, the Husayni faction was the political adversary of the Nashashibi faction, which was allied with the British administration. In 1935, Syrian journals close to the Nashashibis published a letter from Arslan to the Mufti meant to discredit the latter. The letter outlined a plan by Arslan for making Italian propaganda in the Arab world, and although it was eventually widely accepted to be a fake, it created a storm of controversy and involved Arslan in the fierce atmosphere of Jerusalem politics. The ideological positions and practical alliance between Arslan and the Mufti were common knowledge, and compromising either of them had repercussions on the other. During the Second World War, both Arslan and the Mufti found themselves on the side of Germany and Italy, the Mufti spending several years in Berlin and Arslan advising him on what policies to pursue.²⁵

The third significant relationship of Shakib Arslan was, not surprisingly, his brother 'Adil. One of the leading young Istiqlalists, 'Adil Arslan was close both ideologically and politically to his older brother Shakib. His presence further cemented the alliance within the Syrian-Palestinian Congress between the young pan-Arab Istiqlalists and Shakib Arslan. In fact, 'Adil Arslan and the Istiqlalists, Shakib Arslan, Rashid Rida, and Hajj Amin al-Husayni formed a closely-knit block within the Syrian-Palestinian Congress. During the Syrian revolt, toward the end of 1925, young Istiqlalists created with Hajj Amin al-Husayni a special finance committee in Jerusalem. Istiqlalist leaders such as Shukri al-Quwwatli, who opposed the Hashemites, were amenable to receive aid from Ibn Saud, and they also began to channel other funds toward the Jerusalem Committee rather than to the Cairo Executive of the Syrian-Palestinian congress. This was a challenge to Michel Lutfallah, President of the Syrian-Palestinian Congress, who owed his position to his funding of congress activities. The situation reached a crisis when in October 1927 Shakib Arslan resigned from the Executive of the Syrian-Palestinian Congress, pushing Rashid Rida and the Istiqlalist wing of

the executive in Cairo and Jerusalem to take the leadership by ousting Lutfallah. The latter formed his own executive committee, and by December there were two antagonistic Syrian-Palestinian Congress committees. Opposing what has at times been called the “Istiqlalist faction,” the “Rida-Istiqlalist faction,” or the “Rida-Arslan faction,” was Michel Lutfallah’s ally ‘Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar, an Arab nationalist from before the First World War who became one of the rebel chiefs during the Syrian revolt and an exiled independentist afterwards.²⁶ The rift between Shahbandar and Shakib Arslan mirrored the one dividing many of the Syrian nationalists, and it would never heal.

The reasons for the schism within the Syrian-Palestinian Congress may appear surprising when one considers that its members were all fighting a difficult battle against the French and British for Syrian-Palestinian independence. Yet the similarity stops there, and deep ideological rifts separated each party’s vision of the society, of the future, and of the best way to achieve it. In a perceptive passage, Khoury elaborates:

The Arslan-Istiqlali branch of the movement was avowedly pan-Arabist, anti-Hashemite, and opposed to cooperating with the British. It stood for the complete liberation of all Arab peoples and territories from foreign rule and the establishment of a unitary Arab state. . . . Shahbandar’s People’s Party and the dominant faction on the Syrian-Palestine Congress Executive [until 1927] were close to the Hashemites and willing to cooperate with the British to accomplish their more limited goal, the establishment of an independent Syrian state. On the question of Lebanon, the Lutfallah-Shahbandar faction, under the influence of Michel Lutfallah, appeared willing to accept a Greater Lebanon.²⁷

In the 1921 meeting of the Syrian-Palestinian Congress, the lines separating these two parties were already drawn, and in later years ideological rifts would combine with personal antagonisms to usher a split of the congress.

During the Syrian revolt of 1925–1926, the competition between the two factions was fierce, but still left a certain amount of cooperation for their common cause. For a moment there appeared the possibility that a treaty could grant Syria a limited independence while securing France’s strategic and economic interests.²⁸ The unpopular French commissioner Maurice Sarrail was replaced by the relatively liberal de Jouvenel. The new commissioner telegraphed Shakib Arslan in Geneva, inviting him for talks in Paris. In a first meeting in November 1925, Arslan’s moderation impressed de Jouvenel. Khoury writes that some members of the Syrian-Palestinian Congress headquartered in Cairo, namely Lutfallah and Shahbandar, were irritated by Arslan’s success in securing access to a high-ranking French official. Upon their meeting de Jouvenel in Cairo, they took a hard line of no compromise which alienated the High Commissioner, who buried the accords. This was not, however, the end of the story, for Arslan’s journal *La Nation Arabe* reveals that there was a subsequent meeting with de Jouvenel the

following July in Paris, in which Arslan, his associate Jabiri, as well as Lutfallah participated in three working sessions, “during which several conditions [of the agreement] were defined.”²⁹ Arslan believes that it was the influence exercised by the Maronite Lebanese Shukri Ghanem on the head of the Poincaré government, and French officials rather than factionalism within the Syrian-Palestinian congress, that made the accord fail. According to Arslan, de Jouvenel reported to Poincaré that “we thought it possible to speak with the Syrian nationalists to see if there was the possibility of an agreement,” to which Poincaré is said to have answered, “[to speak] with the enemies of France.”³⁰ Shortly afterwards, de Jouvenel was replaced by Ponsot as High Commissioner of Syria.³¹

Ten years later, in 1936, when the Syrian delegation led by Hashem al-Atasi, leader of the National Bloc and soon to be president of the Syrian Republic, went to Paris to sign the treaty with France, al-Atasi, Sa’dallah al-Jabiri, and Riyad al-Sulh made several trips to Geneva to consult with Arslan. The French were also careful to gain his consent to the treaty, and the French vice-minister of foreign affairs, Viénot, met Arslan for lunch in Geneva. Afterwards, Viénot wrote to the French High Commissioner in Syria Martel that Arslan’s influence, both inside of Syria, where he constituted a counterweight to Shahbandar’s opposition to the treaty, and in the Arab world, made him a “factor which we cannot ignore.”³² Cleveland further notes that “Arslan’s support could not guarantee the treaty’s passage in the Syrian chamber but his opposition could sabotage it.”³³ On the contrary Shahbandar’s opposition to the treaty did not prove fatal, and it is a testimony to Arslan’s network inside and outside Syria that, as an exile who had not personally participated in Syrian politics for two decades, he still represented an inescapable linchpin in any agreement between France and Syria.

It is argued by Cleveland that Arslan used his position as representative of the congress in Geneva to air his personal views, using *La Nation Arabe* as his “personal mouthpiece.”³⁴ Yet once the schism in the congress was finalized in 1927, one can observe an uninterrupted stream of correspondence and perpetual consultations between Shakib Arslan, Rashid Rida, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, and ‘Adil Arslan. After the pro-Hachemite and secularist wing was separated from the Syrian-Palestinian Congress, the Arslan-Rida-Husayni alliance within the congress was united in both its goals and ideology. Whether the Lutfallah-Shahbandar branch of the Syrian-Palestinian Congress exhibited a similar unity would require a separate study, yet in light of the remarkable homogeneity shown by the Arslan-Rida-Husayni alliance within the congress we may need to revise our image of a fractionalized Syrian exile community, divided along not only ideological but also regional and personal interests.

Europe

If Arslan’s literary and political career flourished under the Ottoman Empire, it is for the second career that he began at the age of 56 in Europe that he is most often remembered. Arslan most probably owes his encyclopedia definition, “perhaps

the most prominent activist for Muslim political causes between the world wars,” to his 20 years as an anticolonial, pan-Arab, and Islamic activist in interwar Europe.³⁵ Kramer also sees Arslan as one of the two principal spokesmen of the Arabs in the West, along with George Antonius, writing that “between them, these two prolific polemicists repackaged the Arab argument in terms intelligible to foreign audiences, and some of their texts resonate to this day.”³⁶

Arslan enjoyed a complex relationship with Europe. It was the seat of the imperial powers which he fought, yet with his first forays into diplomacy he began his lifelong quest to find a European power that could help Arabs and Muslims achieve freedom and modernization. When Arslan first went to Europe in 1889, Tunis had already been occupied by France in 1881 and Egyptian independence thwarted by British troops in 1882. The initial enthusiasm of such writers such as Tahtawi and Khayr al-Din toward a benevolent and friendly Europe had long passed.³⁷ For Arslan, writes Cleveland, “Europe represented an imperial threat, not an admirable culture.”³⁸ While it is clear that, since Arslan’s earliest days, Europe already embodied the colonizer, scattered evidence exists of his affection for a Europe other than the one which he daily confronted in his anticolonial struggle. In the guest book of the Goethe Museum in Berlin is scribbled a forgotten poem, written in honor of Goethe during Arslan’s first visit to Germany on October 10, 1917:

I bowed the head of my muse before his gate
 Before his doorstep how many have lay prostrate
 Although he is not of my community nor my kin
 The community of man in literature is one
 (For if a common genealogy we do not share
 Between us literature holds the place of the father)³⁹

In his anticolonial campaign waged in Europe, Arslan was a natural ally of European anticolonial movements, and essentially of the French left. If the support of a part of the British left wing for Zionism might have caused an obstacle to a rapprochement with British socialists, it was with the French socialists and radical socialists that Arslan had the most affinity. In the course of defending causes in the Arab East and North Africa, Arslan attended socialist and anti-imperialist congresses in Berne in 1919, Genoa in 1922, and Brussels in 1927, and, despite his vocal aversion to Communism, the tenth Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in Moscow in 1927. Demonstrating his sympathetic but skeptical stance *vis-à-vis* socialism, he would tell the French socialist leader Marcel Cachin in 1919: “we have doubts, even about you; statesmen of the left, once in power, become dreadfully imperialist.” Yet in the case of Cachin, nineteen years later Arslan could still express his continued esteem and sympathy.⁴⁰ Most prominent among the French friends of Arslan is Jean Longuet, grandson of Karl Marx and vice-president of the foreign affairs commission in the French chamber of deputies. In Longuet’s obituary Arslan would reiterate the same theme of truthfulness in the fight against imperialism: “Jean Longuet did not joke about socialist

principles...he advocated a truthful socialism without seeking personal profit, but also without exaltation and without subversive activities.” At the news of both the deaths of Longuet and Pierre Renaudel, another French socialist, Arslan writes of feeling a “true emptiness” at the loss of “real friends.”⁴¹

Arslan’s relationship with Germany was entirely different. He developed links not with the left, but with the Foreign Service officers and academics whose careers could be traced back to Wilhelmian Germany, and to Kaiser Wilhelm II himself. One of the earlier contacts of Arslan with Germany was in 1898, when the Kaiser declared in Damascus that Germany was the protector of 300 million Muslims throughout the world. Standing by his side was Arslan, who had been appointed by Sultan Abdülhamid II as the Kaiser’s escort in the city.⁴² In 1934, Arslan went to see the deposed Kaiser in Doorn,⁴³ and in the March–April 1935 issue of *La Nation Arabe* he would engage in a thirteen page defense of the former Kaiser against charges of having initiated the First World War, at the end of which Arslan asks the same question as his reader: “Why have we taken the trouble, we who are not Germans, of defending the ex-emperor of Germany against these ignominious lies?” To this question, Arslan gives a double reply. First, it is in the name of truth and of resistance against the hegemony of the Allies, who wish to throw the responsibility of the war on Germany and its emperor. The Ottoman Empire’s alliance with Germany and subsequent partition at the hands of the allies make Arslan understandably sympathetic toward such resistance. Second is the Kaiser’s approach toward Islam:

This man has, for his whole career, shown an unshakable impartiality with regard to Muslims. He was the only sovereign of Christian Europe—despite his attachment to his religion and despite being himself head of the Lutheran Church—who could see Islam as a good religion that could inspire consideration and respect.⁴⁴

Arslan goes even further, attributing half of the popularity of Germany in the Islamic world to the political policies of Wilhelm II, the other half being attributed to the simple fact that Germany, having no colonies, attracted less complaints from Muslims.

As a member of the Ottoman parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, Arslan had opportunities to interact with the empire’s wartime ally, Germany. He was, for example, the intermediary between the Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire Said Halim and the German ambassador to Istanbul Wangenheim when relations between both were strained.⁴⁵ He had barely returned to Istanbul from his first visit to Germany in 1917 when Enver Paşa sent him back to Berlin to negotiate certain problems between the Empire and Germany regarding the Caucasus and the Russian fleet in the Black Sea.⁴⁶ With the war ended, Arslan was again in Germany, as president of the Oriental Club, and his relationship with its intelligentsia and leadership continued throughout the interwar period. In an article on the Arab language, Arslan recounts the long evening he spent in 1930 at the home of Hindenburg, President of Germany’s

Weimar Republic, discussing such questions as the abundance of words in Arabic that mean “sadness,” and the scarcity of those that mean “happiness.”⁴⁷

The German governing elite and German orientalist of the interwar period continued to treat Arslan not only as a notable politician who commanded respect for his knowledge of and influence upon the Arab world, but as a living literary prodigy. The journal of the German Society for Islamic Studies carried at least nine book reviews, collections of open letters, translations of articles, or news briefs about Shakib Arslan between 1915 and 1938. This included a 93-page article, 1 part of a 3 part series on contemporary Arabic literature, containing a 13-page biography based on a personal interview of Arslan and 80 pages of translation of some of his works.⁴⁸ The editor of the journal and chairman of the German Society of Islamic Studies was Professor Georg Kampffmeyer, who lectured on Arslan’s literary works in his seminars on oriental languages in Berlin and regarded him as a living example of the renaissance of Arabic literature.⁴⁹ In a review of Arslan’s extensive commentary on the Arabic translation of Lothrop Stoddard’s *The New World of Islam*, Kampffmeyer describes it as a “source of highest importance in the study of the contemporary history of the Orient... from the pen of such an admirable Oriental as the Emir Shakib Arslan.” The work itself illustrates:

The attitude which the Emir, and doubtlessly a significant portion of the contemporary Arab Orient, is taking towards the contemporary world, [an attitude] which is decisive in determining their approach to the present and the future of Islam, in other words for the self-perception of Islam and for its religious and nationalist attitudes, especially that of the Arab Orient with regards to the European incursion.⁵⁰

In this short passage, Kampffmeyer seems to be pointing to the growing Salafi movement and the influence which it would exert upon the Islamic world.

Among Arslan’s European associates and friends one figure stands out, that of “the famed orientalist and friend of the Orient, our friend for forty years, the German baron Max von Oppenheim.”⁵¹ It is characteristic for Arslan to use the traditional figure forty when referring to his closest friends. In many ways, the intellectual pursuits and political involvement of Shakib Arslan and Max Freiherr von Oppenheim ran parallel. A German foreign service officer at the turn of the century, von Oppenheim resigned in 1910 to pursue an interest in archeology and the excavation of the Hittite city of Tell Halal that he had discovered. A world authority on the Hittites, von Oppenheim also seems to have had a deep knowledge of and wide connections in the Arab world, and in times of crisis was called upon to return to the Foreign Ministry. Melka writes that it is von Oppenheim who, as a young Foreign Office official under Kaiser Wilhelm II, inspired the previously mentioned Damascus speech of 1898, in which the Kaiser styled himself as the protector of Muslims. It is unknown when and how Arslan and von Oppenheim first met, but it must have been during those last years of the nineteenth century, when both were young high-ranking representatives of their

respective governments, each with his talent, Arslan in literature and von Oppenheim in archeology. Until their death in 1946 they remained in frequent correspondence, and it seems that while von Oppenheim was Arslan's primary link to the official policy-making circles of the German Foreign Office, Arslan was von Oppenheim's primary Arab advisor on Middle Eastern and Islamic affairs.⁵²

Von Oppenheim exhibited a lifelong interest in allying Germany to the Islamic world, and like Arslan, his model was the Ottoman-Wilhelmian alliance before the First World War. Also similar to Arslan, von Oppenheim drew grand plans for expelling the French and British from the Middle East and for building an alliance with Ibn Saud. It is interesting that the proposals made to the German Foreign Office in the fall of 1940 by the Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Prime Minister of Iraq 'Ali al-Gaylani were similar to those made by von Oppenheim. Melka writes that "the similarity may have been accidental, but even in the absence of correspondence with Arslan for this period the writer is inclined to believe that he, and possibly also von Hentig and Grobba, in some way inspired the major lines of von Oppenheim's memorandum."⁵³ Melka's conclusions are all the more plausible when seen from the perspective of Arslan, for at this time he is said to have written Husayni a constant stream of letters advising him on what course to take, and in September and October 1939 went to Berlin, where he met von Oppenheim.⁵⁴ While it is understandable to see Arslan bent on pushing Germany into a declaration of intentions *vis-à-vis* the Muslim world and an active support of anticolonialism, von Oppenheim's reasons for favoring such an alliance are less clear. They may have stemmed from an academic interest in the Arab world and the memory of the Ottoman-Wilhelmian alliance. Von Oppenheim, Arslan, and Husayni were, however, unable to tip Germany into an Islamic alliance. For one, von Oppenheim's influence seemed to show signs of decline. His well-known Jewish ancestry, although apparently overlooked by the Nazi leadership in view of his services to the state, was coupled with an aristocratic background.⁵⁵ Similar to Arslan, his career and vision was rooted in the Ottoman-Wilhelmian politico-cultural alliance and this did not fit well with the new ultra-nationalist racial ideologies.

If Arslan's relations with the French state were strained and antagonistic, and if his relations with the German state rested on relations with the Foreign Office and its career bureaucrats, those with Italy were almost solely based on the one person who held power in the state. Arslan probably knew Benito Mussolini since 1922, when the latter was still editor of *Popolo d'Italia*, and wrote fiery articles defending the Arab cause. Their first meeting must have been during the congress of the League of Oppressed Nations held in Genoa in 1921. At that time, Arslan, who was president of the Oriental Club in Berlin and secretary of the Genoa congress expressed the gratitude of the delegates for the liberal manner in which they had been allowed to conduct their activities in Italy.⁵⁶ Thereafter Arslan would always refer to "our friend Mussolini" or "our old friend Mussolini," even when engaging in the fiercest attacks against the Duce's policy in Libya.

Arslan was close to Ahmad al-Sharif al-Sanusi, head of the Sanusiyya tariqa, which was at the heart of the resistance movement in Libya, and his attacks

against Italy were virulent. Yet criticizing Mussolini's policies, Arslan adopts the tone of an advisor: "We can assure our old friend Mister Mussolini that all of this will serve him in nothing..."⁵⁷ At other times, he would chide: "... but our friend Mussolini needs conquests, and the gods are thirsty."⁵⁸ For his campaign against the Italians, Arslan would even receive a thankful note from 'Umar al-Mukhtar, the military leader of the Libyan resistance, whom he knew since 1911 when they had fought with the Ottoman troops in an attempt to defend Tripolitania. A few months before his capture and execution by the Italians, Mukhtar wrote to Arslan:

They are excusable, those who cannot believe all of what is said and written about the Italian atrocities, because it is actually difficult to believe that in the world there are men who behave in this unbelievable manner, but it is unfortunately only too real.⁵⁹

From 1930 to 1933 at least twelve virulent criticisms of Italian policies appeared in *La Nation Arabe*, similar to the ones aimed against France and later Great Britain. They were in line with Arslan's uncompromising anticolonial stance. During the year 1933, the articles in *La Nation Arabe* were critical of Italy, but began pointing toward specific policies which it could take to improve the situation of Arabs in its colonies. The Arab press reported that Mussolini wished to meet Arslan, but that the latter refused until the inhabitants of the Green Mountain in Libya had been repatriated. This condition was fulfilled, and in January 1934 *La Nation Arabe* printed the first positive article about Italy. This was followed by Arslan's trip to Rome during which he met Mussolini twice, as well as the Marquis Theodoli, president of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. At the 1935 Muslim Congress of Europe, the Italian orientalist Laura Vagliera was the only non-Muslim allowed to attend and present a paper in Arabic on "What Europe thinks of Islam." Arslan himself read a letter from a Libyan correspondent who wrote that great strides had been taken, although much remained to be done in Italian administered Libya.⁶⁰

Arslan explains the process which brought him to negotiate with Italy in the following manner:

When we cried out in condemnation against the unbelievable acts which General Graziani had committed, Mussolini sought to have a conversation with us and sent us an envoy to find out what should be done to repair these wrongs. We answered that before anything else, the Arabs should be reintegrated into their homes. He did it and saved them from a certain death... also upon our request, three to four hundred Arabs condemned to twenty to thirty years of prison term were amnestied. On our request also, the properties which are called "waqf"... were restituted to the Muslims. ... Muslim education... was restored in all state schools. ... We asked for the prohibition of all Christian religious propaganda among Muslims. ... Mussolini himself told us that it was absolutely forbidden and that he would never tolerate such propaganda...⁶¹

Although criticized for reaching a settlement with Italy, Arslan knew that he needed allies in Europe, and of the three colonial powers, France, Britain, and Italy, Mussolini was most sensitive to the good and bad press that appeared about Italy in the Muslim world, making him susceptible to negotiations. On the Syrian question, his attitude always seemed “correct and even well-meaning” to Arslan.⁶² Mussolini’s Italy gave an independentist leader like Arslan a rare occasion to influence the official policy of a colonial power, and if Arslan’s grander political schemes of a general Italian-German alliance with the Arab world against the British and French did not materialize before the outbreak of the European war, he in the meantime caused a flurry of secret service reports and considerable worry to French authorities.

Not one to equate the Islamic world with the Arab world, Arslan’s Islamic network stretched within Europe. Although there seems little evidence that the nationals of European states who were Muslim engaged in widespread anticolonial campaigns, *La Nation Arabe* mentions several of both immigrant and European background. Much more numerous were the Muslim communities from Eastern Europe. They had been subjects of the Ottoman Empire, and during the first Balkan War of 1912 Arslan had coordinated the activities of the Red Crescent, an Egyptian benevolent society, to assist Muslim refugees in the Balkans. In the Ottoman parliament, Arslan had not only been an intermediary with Germany, but had also been on the committee responsible for managing the strained relations with Russia.⁶³ Finally, a more personal detail is that Arslan’s mother and his wife Salima were from the Caucasus. It may thus not be so surprising if Arslan, in his new role as pan-Islamic activist in Geneva, came to devote time to the Eastern European Islamic world.

La Nation Arabe carried regular articles, and even polemics, regarding Eastern European Islam. Between 1932 and 1936, eight articles about Islam in Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, Yugoslavia, and Hungary appeared under the pen of Smail Džemalović, including one well-known polemic between him and André Girard, law professor at the University of Paris, about the condition of Muslims in Bulgaria.⁶⁴ What is interesting is not only that such articles had an academic value, but that they brought to Europe controversies that raged in the Bulgarian, Turkish, and Arabic press, thus contesting the monopoly that European academics and Christian missionaries exercised on the representation of these regions.⁶⁵

Although the information that we have about Arslan’s trip to Eastern Europe is disparate and incomplete, in the vastly unexplored field of Eastern European Islam we can locate flashes of Arslan’s passage in the region. In 1931 Arslan would make a quick visit to Yugoslavia, and a longer one in December 1933 and January 1934, “to spend Ramadan with my Yugoslavian friends.” He would then continue to Belgrade, then Budapest, where he was a guest of the former Hungarian Minister of Justice Stefan Barscy and members of the Association of Gül Baba, a group dedicated to the construction of a mosque near the tomb of a fifteenth-century dervish saint in Budapest. Throughout the interwar period Arslan seems to have had regular contact with Hungarian Muslims and with

Huszein Hilmi Durics, who came to be recognized as their Mufti in 1934–1936. In the 1930s he would continue writing letters and making occasional visits, encouraging Hungarian Muslims to continue their attempts to build a mosque at Gül Baba and assuring them that they enjoyed the support of the Muslim world, with which he appears to have been their primary link.⁶⁶

The small Muslim community in Budapest consisted of no more than a few hundred Bosnian immigrant workers of humble origins. It had remained unknown in the Muslim world and was largely isolated, writes Popovic, until the early 1930s when Arslan was almost single handedly responsible for the publicity it began receiving in the Arab and Muslim press:

The situation changed suddenly in 1932, and from that date on we can find a series of notices concerning Hungarian Islam. It must be stressed, however, that on the ground nothing had changed, and that it was nothing other than a campaign begun by the Emir Shakib Arslan, who, while preparing the European Muslim Congress of Geneva (in 1933?) [*sic*], had sought to strengthen the position of this isolated Muslim community of Central Europe.⁶⁷

In this way, Arslan was developing the links of Eastern European Muslims with the Arab East and the greater Muslim world. One of the central events in the development of this trans-regional Islamic consciousness would be the European Congress of Muslims, which Arslan presided in Geneva in September 1935.

The congress was strictly European, in that it brought together about 60 to 70 delegates, all of whom were residents of Europe. If we look at the Permanent Committee that was established after the congress, it consisted of Geneva's prominent Muslims, with Arslan and Jabiri from Syria, Ali al-Ghayati, 'Abd al-Baqi al-'Umari, Zaki 'Ali, and Mahmud Salim al-'Arafati from Egypt, and a former Iranian prime minister Tabataba'i. The council of delegates, on the contrary, included the leaders of Muslim communities from all of Europe, with Iqbal 'Ali Shah from England, Omar Stewart Rankin from Scotland, Messali Hadj from France, H. v. M. Aly Mohri-Eddine from Switzerland, Mohammad-Aly van Beetem from Holland, Ghassam Zade from Austria, Bernard Barbiellini Amidei from Italy, Huszein Hilmi Durics from Hungary, Jakub Szynekiewicz from Poland, and Dervis Korkut from Yugoslavia. These delegates included an approximately even number of European nationals and of immigrants from Muslim countries. The language of this multinational grouping was officially Arabic, the language of Islam, although delegates also expressed themselves in Turkish, English, German, and French, the latter being most commonly used.⁶⁸

A European Muslim Congress being a unique occurrence, it is not surprising if most speeches concerned local issues. Popular topics included the construction of mosques, the education of children, the rights of Muslims in European countries, and the way in which Muslim communities, most of them religious minorities within their respective states, were treated by their governments. Yet these local

issues were Islamic issues, and as such acquired universal relevance. The congress thus asked for contributions from the whole Muslim world to help build a mosque in Warsaw, while individual members expressed the hope of eventually building mosques in Budapest, Amsterdam, and Geneva. Telegrams and press releases in the name of the congress acknowledged the Yugoslav and Polish governments for the favorable treatment of their Muslim populations. The Palestinian question and the holy city of Jerusalem were similarly considered not as political but as religious issues concerning all Muslims, and the congress sent telegrams to all concerned parties. For Western Europe and its nascent Islamic community, the gathering was an early and still limited show of solidarity. For Eastern Europe, the congress was part of ongoing efforts by Arslan, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, and others, to maintain and revive its links with the wider Muslim world in the aftermath of the end of the Ottoman Empire.

Several prominent figures from Eastern Europe were in attendance at the congress. One of the most respected was Jakub Szynekiewicz, a Pole of Tatar origin, who had earned a doctoral degree with a dissertation on “Rabghuzi’s Syntax” in Berlin and was in close relationship with Georg Kampffmeyer, chairman of the German Society for Islamic Studies, which Szynekiewicz had helped found. He was highly regarded by members of German academia, and the society’s journal *Die Welt des Islams* described the qualities most appreciated by his German hosts:

Without doubt, Dr. Jakub Szynekiewicz is one of the most capable Muslims in Europe, highly gifted in organization, of great capabilities, a man, who with his powerful and pure Islamic strength of character combines reason and an extraordinary spiritual culture.⁶⁹

In 1925 Szynekiewicz was elected by the Pan-Polish Muslim Congress Mufti of Poland, a position which he used to create links between Poland’s Muslim community and the rest of the Islamic world.⁷⁰ He was, for example, active in the society of Muslim youths in Cairo, and later succeeded in obtaining a grant of land from the Polish government to construct a mosque in Warsaw. Szynekiewicz was a member of the Oriental Club in Berlin when Arslan was its president, and later visited Arslan in the winter of 1934–1935.⁷¹ Having attended the Muslim Congress in Cairo in 1926, he headed a Polish delegation to the European Muslim Congress.

The largest delegation at the congress was the 7-member Yugoslav delegation, with its members giving 5 of the 19 speeches. Derviš Korkut, museum curator and editor of a journal in Belgrade, presented the history of Yugoslav Muslims, Vejsil Alisan, president of the Council of Ulama of Uskub, spoke of religious educational organization in Southern Yugoslavia, Džemaludin Čaušević, former president of the Council of Ulama and a statistician, gave details, and Abdul Hamid Huramović, president of the Muslim Association and member of the Oriental Institute of Warsaw, did not speak about Yugoslavia but about Islam in Poland. The Yugoslav delegation was thus not only large but also vocal. Its head was the widely acknowledged leader of the Balkan Muslim world, Salim Muftić,

Mufti of Sarajevo since 1914, president of the Council of Ulama and head of the Bosnian delegation to the Jerusalem congress four years earlier. He was the one to make the first address after Arslan's introduction and a minute of silence in remembrance of Rashid Rida. In an obituary Arslan would describe him as "one of the most eminent notables not only of the Balkans, but of the whole Islamic world."⁷²

Outstanding questions about the congress remain. One is tempted to ask why it was a *European* Muslim congress, while all previous congresses were universal in that they were open to all Muslims irrespective of geographic origin. Whatever its reason, this appellation may highlight that Europe was a region possessing its own internal logic. Arslan was conversant in its language, but also had deep and unquestionable roots in Arab culture and in the Islamic revivalist movement. To those in Europe he represented the link to that wider Islamic world in the Arab East. To those in the Arab East, his role was to provide a link in the other direction.

The independent Arab states

While most of the Arab world lay under the dominion of foreign mandatory powers, the kingdoms of the Arab East provided an arena where an Arab and Islamic culture was relatively free to develop. Had Arslan accepted Ibn Saud's offer to bring his family to the Saudi capital and become a high official in his administration,⁷³ or had he been present and active in local politics in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, or elsewhere, his perspective on specific social, economic, or cultural policies might have developed. As an international activist based in Geneva, his strategy was to transcend dynastic divisions and apply the ideal of an Arab and Islamic community to the relations between Faisal's kingdom in Iraq, Ibn Saud's kingdom in the Hijaz and Nejd, and Imam Yahya's kingdom in the Yemen. Other regions of the Arab, it was believed, would join this community as their independence progressed.

Although Arslan had supported the Ottoman Empire in the face of Sharif Husayn of Mecca until 1918, he supported Husayn's son, Faisal, in his efforts to unite Iraq and Syria under his throne. Before becoming king of Iraq, Faisal had, for a few short years, enjoyed the position of king of Syria before the French mandate was imposed in 1920. These few years, however, remained in the imagination of nationalists and Istiqlalists such as 'Adil Arslan, Shakib's brother, and Ihsan al-Jabiri, his associate in Geneva, as a golden time when Syria had been ruled by an Arab monarch with its nationalist intelligentsia charting the future. Although he became king of Iraq, the memory of Faisal remained in the mind of many Syrian nationalists, and the prime obstacle to his claim for the throne of Syria seemed to be the French mandate.

Much more immediately achievable were Arslan's plans to build a united Arab state. These were outlined in a series of articles, and lobbied for in the course of several trips and negotiations that sought to create "an alliance of the three independent Arab states" as a first step to Arab unity.⁷⁴ The central point of contention

was the personal rivalry between Ibn Saud, King of the Hijaz and Nejd, and Faisal of Iraq, whose father the Sharif Husayn of Mecca, had been expelled from the Hijaz by Ibn Saud. In 1929, Arslan made a highly publicized pilgrimage to Mecca, where he spent the summer as the personal guest of Ibn Saud in the latter's summer residence in Taef. From there he worked on improving relations between Ibn Saud and his neighbors to the North and South. Although little is known about the specific discussions of that summer, the most pressing need seems to have been the creation of trust between the two foes. Arslan takes credit for conceiving the project with King Faisal at Antibes in Southern France in early 1930,⁷⁵ which resulted in the signing of a treaty of friendship on February 22, 1930.

More than a loose treaty, however, Arslan had hoped for a true alliance, military and otherwise, between the two Arab states. On the morning of Faisal's death, September 7, 1933, Arslan had a one-and-one-half hour meeting with the Iraqi monarch, most of which was spent discussing plans for strengthening the pan-Arab alliance with Ibn Saud. According to Arslan, Faisal seems to have been so enthused by the idea that he is said to have told him: "I may be the personal adversary of Ibn Saud, but for the good of the Arabs I must be his brother. Actually, without Ibn Saud the center of the Arabic peninsula would have fallen in anarchy. Had Ibn Saud not been there, we would have had to create him." Two years after Faisal's death, the project of a more thorough alliance was realized between the successor to the throne of Iraq, Ghazi, and Ibn Saud, later to be joined by Imam Yahya of Yemen. Arslan calculated that the alliance of these 3 nations created a bloc of 18 million subjects, which would rise to 40 million once Syria-Palestine and Egypt participated.⁷⁶

If the ambitions of Ibn Saud had been successfully accommodated with those of Faisal and his successor, the relations between Ibn Saud's and his Southern neighbor, Imam Yahya of the much smaller state of the Yemen, only became more belligerent. Already in 1929, during his pilgrimage to Mecca, Arslan had discussed the contentious issue of the province of Asir, on which both monarchs laid claims. The matter came to a confrontation in 1934, when armies of about fifty thousand men from each side clashed. The war between two of a handful of independent Arab or Islamic monarchs was understandably a grave threat to pan-Arab and pan-Islamic solidarity.

Shortly after the beginning of the conflict, the permanent bureau of the Islamic Congress in Jerusalem under the leadership of Hajj Amin al-Husayni named a four-man delegation to arbitrate between both sovereigns. The committee consisted of Amin al-Husayni himself, Muhammad 'Ali, a former minister in the Egyptian government, Hashim al-Atasi, the acknowledged leader of Syria's independence movement, and Shakib Arslan. The arbiters were eventually successful in tempering Ibn Saud's military ardor, but for Arslan, even in the midst of the fiercest fighting, Arabs could be seen engaging in nothing other than a family feud, "for the Arab nation is the Arab Nation, always forming a single bloc, sharing the same feelings and traditions. This unity of customs and of feelings surpasses all other considerations for the Arabs."⁷⁷ It is in the light of such words and actions that Arslan's postwar reputation as a hero of Arab nationalism can be understood.

In 1929, most probably in a rhetorical flourish, Ibn Saud nominated Arslan as his “ambassador in Europe.”⁷⁸ Arslan acted, however, less like an ambassador than like a senior counselor. As previously mentioned, his personal loyalty was to the Arab and Islamic cause, and he entertained brotherly relations with each monarch as long as they served that cause. Yet to his last days, he not only arbitrated between the monarchs of the Arab Peninsula, but advised these formerly Bedouin tribal leaders, ignorant as they were of modern European politics and of how to maneuver in the international arena. In Arslan’s last days, during the Second World War, he sent information bulletins with detailed information about the international situation and the progress of the war to Ibn Saud and in Imam Yahya.⁷⁹ With his Saudi passport, and enjoying a high statute with Ibn Saud, at least until the mid-1930s, Arslan could have gone to live with his family in the Hijaz as the monarch’s advisor and honorary guest. Yet something must have kept him in Switzerland where he was under the eye of the secret service of half a dozen nations, homesick, and perpetually in debt. It may have been the appreciation that distance allowed the Arab “prince of eloquence” to look at the branches of the Arab and Islamic world from aloof, granting him a unique role at the forefront of what he saw as the road to its reunification.

The Maghreb

Most often understood as a pan-Arab leader coming from the Eastern centers of the Arab world, Arslan’s appearances in the history of the Maghreb are limited to a few scattered paragraphs describing the unique attraction that he exerted upon nationalist movements of the region. The most complete account of his influence upon the Maghreb remains Cleveland’s general chapter on his mentorship of the young North African nationalists. Yet specific studies, such as Merad’s analysis of the Algerian Islamic reformist journal *al-Šihāb*, or Halstead’s interviews with Moroccan nationalists in the late 1950s and early 1960s, give an important insight into Arslan’s role, and into how he was perceived by the Moroccan nationalist elite. The analysis of *La Nation Arabe*, combined with a knowledge of Arslan’s networks in the Muslim, Arab, and European world, reveal a surprising role for Arslan. Throughout the interwar era, he shaped the doctrines and strategies of nationalist students in Paris, of the ulama from each region, and of Islamic revivalist thinkers in the Maghreb.⁸⁰

Morocco’s nascent nationalist movement consisted of highly educated young men, often from prestigious families, who were marginalized by the overwhelming influence of the French protectorate and the general apathy of the Moroccan public. The catalyst that allowed them to ignite Moroccan nationalism was the promulgation of the Berber Dahir on May 16, 1931.⁸¹ The Berber Dahir is significant in that Berbers, who had been Islamized in the early days of Islam, and were thus placed under the jurisdiction of Islamic law and liable to Islamic courts, were now placed under the jurisdiction of French courts and Berber tribunals that applied a revived traditional Berber law antecedent to Islam. To Muslims throughout the

world, it seemed that France was seeking to de-Islamize the Berbers as a first step to their Christianization. These fears were fanned by the increased presence of French missionaries in rural areas of Morocco, and by the prohibition for Moroccans from the “Arab regions” of going to the “Berber regions” without a special permit, which prevented Muslim clerics in the cities from maintaining contact with the Berbers. While some saw in this a policy of de-Islamization, others saw it as another application of the colonial policy of “divide and rule.”

The Berber Dahir had three consequences. The first is the *yā laṭīf* (“O God!”) incantations, usually recited in mosques at times of great calamity. Previously reserved for such disasters as plagues of locusts, the *yā laṭīf* was for the first time harnessed by the nationalists for political action. Beginning in the great mosque of Rabat on a Friday after the communal prayer, the *yā laṭīf* incantations spread throughout Morocco, a powerful means for the nationalist elite to impart to the masses its sense of crisis at the breaking of the union uniting Berbers and Arabs under the banner of Islam. Second, as a result of the widespread *yā laṭīf* incantations and the protests that accompanied them, the young Moroccan Sultan agreed to receive a delegation to discuss the grievances of the population. The future Muhammad V of Morocco was young, educated completely under the protectorate, and did not yet have the will or the power to oppose the French administration. This first meeting with the nationalists, however, was a first step to what years later become an alliance crucial to both the independence movement and the Moroccan monarchy.

Yet the slow rise in the political consciousness of the Moroccan masses and of the Sultan would only bear fruit in later years. The immediate pressure exerted on the French came from the third measure, the international campaign. A storm of protest from the Arab and Islamic world caused committees in defense of Moroccan Muslims to spring up from Java to Berlin, an economic boycott to be enacted against French goods in India, and a petition by the ulama of al-Azhar asking the Egyptian King Fuad to personally intervene before the French government.⁸² International organisms found themselves submerged by telegrams of protests and, in the words of Julien, Shakib Arslan “integrated Muslim Morocco into Islamic ritual by making all of the faithful participate in the trials of their Maghrebi brothers.”⁸³

Arslan denounced the Dahir in a dozen articles in *La Nation Arabe* and wrote in the Arabic press, mostly in the Egyptian journal *al-Fath*. In successive analyses of French policy in Morocco, Arslan compared the Ottoman Empire’s religious policy, which allowed each religious minority to be ruled by its own laws, with the attempt by republican France to separate the Berbers from the Arabs under the pretext that they had different ethnic customs.⁸⁴ Arslan was not only active in publicizing the issue in the press, but was central in drawing the resolution sent by the Islamic Congress held in Jerusalem in 1931 to the League of Nations. Arslan provided the link between the congress members, and namely its president Hajj Amin al-Husayni, and Makki Nasiri, the young Moroccan nationalist who drew up the resolution with Arslan and Jabiri in Geneva. Approved by the Congress, the

resolution was signed by its president and forwarded to the League of Nations.⁸⁵ In the end the protest about the Berber Dahir attained much more dramatic proportions outside of Morocco than inside, where French authorities maintained a relative calm. The prime reason, writes Le Tourneau, was Arslan:

This incomparable conductor sparked throughout the entire Muslim world a concert of protests against French politics in Morocco, a frenzy that was in marked contrast with the calm that was reigning inside of the country. Because of Shakib Arslan, Morocco was at the forefront of Islamic events.⁸⁶

The results had both immediate and more long-term repercussions. In immediate terms, the international protests contributed to placing the Islamic world and the anticlerical European left squarely against the Berber Dahir, leading to its replacement in 1934.⁸⁷ Indirectly, however, the Berber Dahir awakened a new consciousness among Moroccan and North African nationalists. A few years later, on October 4, 1937, Arslan was second vice-president of the Bludan Congress against Zionist immigration to Palestine, when throughout Morocco's cities protests were organized to mark Morocco's solidarity with the Palestinian cause.⁸⁸ Before 1930, such a mass demonstration of Arab and Islamic unity between inhabitants of the Northwest tip of Africa and those around Damascus and Jerusalem would have been almost unimaginable. No one more than Arslan could claim credit for sowing the seeds of a transnational consciousness, manifested as it was in the protest against the Berber Dahir.

Arslan's active involvement in Moroccan politics can be dated to 1930. At that time, the pages of *La Nation Arabe* announced that Arslan would make an academic visit to the Iberian peninsula to prepare a work on the history of Muslim Spain.⁸⁹ In addition to its scholarly purposes, however, the trip constituted an occasion to travel to Morocco and meet some of its most prominent young nationalists, future leaders of the independence period and the postcolonial era. Arslan first stopped in Paris, where he was met at the train station by 'Allal al-Fasi and Balafrej, described by Halstead as the two highest ranking members of the Moroccan nationalist movement.⁹⁰ Although both were students in Paris at this time, Fasi came from a prominent family of Fez and had received a traditional education at the Qarawiyyin University, while Ahmad Balafrej was from Rabat and had received a completely Western education at French elite schools. Both young students, who were to lead Morocco to independence in 1956, are known to have visited Arslan in Geneva. Yet Balafrej, the future founder of the Moroccan Istiqlal Party, stands out as one of the dearest "spiritual sons" of the Amir. Halstead remarks that despite having been so thoroughly gallicized in French schools, Balafrej is said to have been "more profoundly affected politically by Arslan than by his formal education."⁹¹ Arslan did not limit his relationships to politics or even to the intellectual life of his young followers. In response to an interrogation from the Swiss police, and asked why he sent Balafrej

500 Swiss Francs whenever he could afford it, Arslan answered that “I came to his aid because I consider him a little like my son.”⁹² Of Arslan’s “spiritual sons,” many came from the Maghreb.

Arslan could only stay for a few days in Paris, and soon left for Madrid and Southern Spain. After completing their examinations, Fasi and Balafrej joined him there, and all three of them visited the convent at Escorial to examine Arabic documents relating to the period of Islamic rule in Spain.⁹³ From there Arslan proceeded to Tangier, where he was quickly notified of a decree expelling him from the French zone, and pursued his journey to Tetouan, a neighboring city under Spanish control. In Tetouan he spent four days at the house of ‘Abd al-Salam Bennuna, an acknowledged leader, former Minister of the Makhzen, and founder and director of an indigenous electrical company and free school.⁹⁴ Arslan had been in contact with Bennuna long before meeting him, for both must have been members of the same Islamic reformist networks in the Arab world. After 1931 and before his death in 1935, Bennuna went to see Arslan once, stopping in Geneva on his return from Berlin.⁹⁵ During his stay in Tetouan, receptions welcomed Arslan as a prominent literary figure from the Arab East whose reputation and writings had long preceded his arrival. His presence not only flattered the Moroccans, but helped bridge the gaps separating the heterogeneous independence movements in Tetouan, Rabat, Fez, and throughout Morocco.

Both in Geneva and when he went to Paris, Arslan entertained numerous North African visitors and students, keeping the French secret service busy. Arslan even took one of the Moroccan nationalist leaders, Mohamed al-Ouezzani, as his private secretary in Geneva from September 1932 until the summer of 1933.⁹⁶ In 1936, the Spanish civil war between General Franco’s insurgents and the Republican loyalists provided a splendid opportunity to play off one faction against another. Arslan traveled to Madrid where he was joined by Ouezzani and ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Jalil to offer help against Franco in return for the independence of Northern Morocco.⁹⁷

While the campaign against the Berber Dahir found expression in the pages of *La Nation Arabe*, *al-Fath* of Cairo and other journals, by the 1930s Arslan was highly experienced in political activism on the European scene, had extensive networks in Europe, the Arab world, and the Islamic world, and was probably the most prolific Arab writer of his age, with a regular stream of articles appearing in the Arab press. All of this brought undeniable benefit to young Moroccans seeking an Arab-Islamic identity and an anticolonial strategy. When Ouezzani engaged in a conflict with Fasi and Balafrej, Arslan admonished his “spiritual sons” to exhibit moderation and unity, and when circumstances required it, Arslan became a father figure, financially assisting his protégés, despite his own precarious financial position.

In addition to the Islamic reformists, Arslan seems to have enjoyed the respect of some in the younger and largely secular generation. With the French socialists in power and the Franco-Syrian Treaty placing Syria on the road to independence in 1937, Arslan traveled to a hero’s welcome in Paris. A special banquet was given in his honor by the Moroccan nationalist movement, and on this occasion the

secular leader of Tunisia's independence movement, the future President of Tunisia Habib Bourguiba, devoted an entire issue of his nationalist journal *L'Action tunisienne* to Arslan.⁹⁸

However, the most spectacular and oft-cited example of Arslan's influence over the young nationalists is the "conversion" of Messali al-Hajj during his stay in Geneva. The young and radical leader of Algerian workers in France was the founder of the *Étoile Nord-Africaine*, which was a close and faithful ally of the French Communist party. The French court having condemned him to yet another term in prison, Messali al-Hajj found refuge before Arslan in Geneva, where he stayed for half a year in 1936. It is difficult to know what privately occurred during those few months, but when Messali al-Hajj reappeared in Paris, he had traded his militant Communist stance advocating Algerian independence for an equally adamant Arab nationalist and Islamic approach to the problem. In 1933, Messali's party the *Étoile Nord-Africaine* published in its French language journal *El Ouma* a new political program declaring its "fraternity in the unity of Islam," but without abandoning its adamant nationalist and proletarian stand.⁹⁹ Messali's Islamic allegiance had superseded his Communist allegiance, resulting in mutual accusations and a break with the Communist party.¹⁰⁰ Joining himself to the Algerian ulama, to Tunisia's New Destour Party, and to the Action Marocaine party of the Moroccan reformers, writes Julien, Messali "rallied to the solid, prudent and skillful program defended by the leaders of the Maghreb parties with spiritual allegiance to Shakib Arslan. The revolutionary had given way to the Muslim."¹⁰¹

Throughout the Maghreb, Arslan is known to have been in contact with leading Islamic reformers. In Libya Arslan entertained an intimate friendship with Sidi Ahmad al-Sharif al-Sanusi, leader of the Sanusiyya tariqa and of the resistance against Italian colonization: "For 20 years, our correspondence did not cease for more than two months at most, not to mention the time that we lived together in Mersin [Southern Turkey]." Arslan was, however, more than a counselor to independence movements, for in studying the contents of the Algerian reformist journal *al-Šihāb*, Ali Merad engages in an unprecedented appraisal of Arslan's influence within the circle of Ibn Badis' Algerian Islamic reformist movement:

The Emir Shakib Arslan exercised such intellectual seduction and moral and political influence on the [editorial] team of *Šihāb* that it is impossible to analyze the cultural doctrine of the Algerian reformists without taking into account the thought of the Emir. Since he settled down in Switzerland (Geneva-Lausanne), in the aftermath of the First World War, and especially since he began to publish *La Nation Arabe*, Shakib Arslan became not only a master, but a true oracle to the Algerian elite of Arab culture. Mentor for some, director of conscience for others, counselor whose advice was received with humble gratitude, orator whose language made sensitive souls fall into ecstasy, writer whose fluid and pure prose was a delectation for all lovers of the beauty of the classical tongue, Shakib Arslan was all of this at the same time, and even more.¹⁰²

Perhaps more so than most other figures of his time, Shakib Arslan's Arab, Ottoman, and European culture allowed him to exercise a varied and multifaceted influence upon those who knew him.

La Nations Arabe was not only read in Paris, but despite its proscription in all French mandates and colonies, it continued to be smuggled into Morocco, where it was known to a relatively wide audience of nationalists.¹⁰³ Yet with regard to the Maghreb, it is difficult to characterize Arslan as a pan-Arab, for he was ideologically much less so than many others.¹⁰⁴ He advocated an Eastern Arab nation that included Egypt, and encouraged the countries of the Maghreb to cooperate and establish as many links as possible, both among themselves and with the rest of the Arab and Islamic world. Yet for tactical reasons, and partly because he feared that in his time it might lead to a new form of intra-Arab colonialism, Arslan did not favor an Arab nation that would extend from the Gulf to Morocco. For such a moderate stance, Arslan was the subject of virulent attacks by such pan-Arabs as Sulayman Baruni.¹⁰⁵ Although outside of the concern of this paper, it may be said that Arslan's identity lay more in a cultural form of Arabism than with pan-Arabism, and most of all in the Islamic revivalist movement. To young students from the Maghreb, he offered a modern and Islamic doctrine capable of adapting their complex relationship with modern West, which they both absorbed and rejected, and their awakening Arab and Islamic identity.

The Manarists

Although this chapter has thus far adopted a regional division of Arslan's network, this section will refer not to a region but to a school of thought. While the Islamic reformer Rashid Rida certainly had a role in Syrian nationalism, his main role was neither in Syria nor in Egypt but within the world of *al-Manār* and of the ideas that it propagated in the Islamic world. Similarly, while Muhammad 'Abduh, Muhammad 'Ali Taher, and Ahmad Shawqi were all Egyptians, they addressed themselves to the whole Islamic world and to all Arabic readers. Most restless of all was Afghani, and it is to him that Arslan is most often compared.

The process which would bring Arslan out of Lebanese mountain society began when he was sixteen and met Muhammad 'Abduh, who in 1886 was lecturing in Beirut. Rashid Rida met Arslan in 'Abduh's classes and, in the words of Arslan, "the links of friendship that have united us for forty years were caused by our having the same leader."¹⁰⁶ A few years later, in 1890, Arslan was introduced to 'Abduh's circle in Cairo, to Sa'd Zaghlul, 'Ali Yusuf, and the literary and political elite of Egyptian society. For Arslan, who was known as a close associate of Rida and a frequent contributor to *al-Manār*, it is more than probable that after 'Abduh's death, the network of *al-Manār* continued to provide Arslan with links throughout the Islamic world.

On his way back from a trip to Paris in 1889, Arslan stopped in Istanbul and met Afghani.¹⁰⁷ Upon Afghani and 'Abduh's teachings, and in association with Rida, he was to strike the ideological roots that anchored his fluid and geographically

diffuse network. Contemporary observers agree that it is Arslan's perpetual adherence to a cause that provided him with the unflinching continuity that ran through his painfully long exile, his strategic alliances with European powers that often bordered on intrigue, and his network that included rulers of the Ottoman Empire and Arab nationalists, antagonistic Arab kings, and links with Communist, Fascist and capitalist states.¹⁰⁸

Except at one time in their life, during Rida's days in the Ottoman Decentralization Committee which competed with the Ottoman state, evidence shows Rida and Arslan in frequent consultation regarding both political philosophy and strategy. Before leaving his country to engage on his expatriate existence in Egypt, next to 'Abduh and as editor of the journal *al-Manār*, Arslan was one of two people that Rida turned to for advice.¹⁰⁹ Yet once both were exiled, Arslan was more often than not barred from spending time in Egypt and their chances to meet were rare. They occasionally did, such as during the meeting of the Syrian–Palestinian delegation in Geneva in 1921, and the short time Arslan was able to spend in Rida's house during his one-day special permission to land in Egypt in 1929, but such chances were fleeting and often took place under conditions of tight security surrounding Arslan.¹¹⁰ After Rida's death in 1935, Arslan promised a commemorative work based on their close collaboration, most of it by correspondence:

Having had the same master, having been bonded together for 40 years, having had a continuous correspondence without any secrets left untold, we have promised, in our memorial writings on our very dear and illustrious friend, a special work on him, which will be entitled *The Sayyid Rashid Rida or a Fraternity of Forty Years*. The Arab press has already noted this promise, which we will strive to carry out as faithfully as we have carried out our promise concerning our other friend Ahmad Shawqi, the greatest contemporary Arab poet.¹¹¹

Arslan's commemorative work for Ahmad Shawqi was written in 1932 and entitled *Shawqi, or a Friendship of Forty Years*. Shawqi and Arslan first met as young poets in the student district of Paris in 1889. Arslan had already engaged in a political career that would lead him to abandon literature, and Shawqi was at the beginning of a literary career that would make him one of the most famed Arab poets of the century.¹¹² Arslan's relationship with Shawqi was literary, and it highlights Arslan not as a politically involved activist, but as *amīr al-bayān*, a literary phenomenon of his age, who was much read and appreciated:

Shawqi is a living dead whose body alone is absent from us but whose soul and spirit, in communion with millions upon millions of souls, will remain eternally as long as there will remain on this planet something called "the Arab language."¹¹³

Arslan claims to have chosen the title of Shawqi's first diwan of poetry, "We have parted physically but remain united in mind and heart," which makes for an accurate description of Arslan's exiled existence and his relationship with his closest friends.¹¹⁴

Conclusion

In eschewing a geographical division of Arslan's network when describing the "Manarists" there lies the possibility for an alternative approach. Arslan's network can be seen as operating on three ideological planes, linking the intellectual currents of Arabism, Islamism, and anticolonialism. The anticolonial network brought together those colonized who were unhappy with their fate, anticolonial activists in colonial countries, and non-colonial countries. Within its framework can be placed all independentist movements, Arslan's links with the anticolonial left in colonial countries, and the state institution in non-colonial or semi-colonial countries. This included Mussolini in Italy, which had few colonies in the Arab and Muslim world, and Germany, which had none. Although French socialists might have cringed at the thought of being lumped with the Fascist regimes, from the perspective of Arslan, they all served the anticolonial cause.

The second network can be referred to as that of Arabism. It regrouped all Arabic speakers, yet did not call for their political union. Arslan's foreseeable goal was to unite the three independent states of Ibn Saud in the Hijaz and Nejd, Imam Yahya in the Yemen, and King Faisal in Iraq. This initial union was later to be joined by the states in geographic Syria and by Egypt, creating a larger Eastern Arab state. There is no evidence to show that union with the Maghreb was thought to be feasible or even desirable. Often using the term "the Arab nation," namely as the title of his French language journal, Arslan has frequently been labeled an Arab nationalist. Yet Arslan's Arab nation drew from Arslan's multifaceted and complex existence, blending into his anticolonial network for strategic reasons, and striking its deepest roots in the Islamic network.

The network of Islamic revivalism clearly concerned all Muslims, but was centered upon the Islamic revivalist movements of each region. Arslan's response was not specifically directed toward the redefinition of Islam or the adaptation of Islamic legal codes to contemporary conditions. This was left to those with a more traditional Islamic education. Arslan, the product of a French, American, and Ottoman civil education, had a different role to play. Muslim students and professionals in Europe, and the newly educated elites inside the Muslim world, were yearning for a worldview that did not see the Islamic religion as flowing counter to the modern world. Europe was important in that for all Muslim students or workers who went there, it provided a stage where the Islamic worldview and Western modernity came in contact. Arslan's network helped Islamic reformists who had little knowledge of Europe to deal with the complexities of European politics, while reassuring nationalist leaders such as Balafrej or Messali al-Hajj that Islam could be a contemporary force in both the personal and public sphere.

It thus contributed to creating links to outside worlds, outside of geographic regions but also outside of the cognitive categories of East and West, Islam and Christianity, and tradition and modernity. It opened its members unto the new opportunities of a wider, interrelated, and contemporary world.

Arslan's network served multiple purposes with regards to the Islamic and non-Islamic world, the Arab and non-Arab world, and the struggle against colonialism. It was there, and it was used to link people belonging to different networks together. It impressed upon many a new form of Arab and Islamic consciousness, it had an impact on the history of the region, and it proclaimed the principles of the Islamic revival and the political existence of Arabs. Yet we must consider the possibility that Arslan's network did not fulfill a solely instrumentalist function. The address made by Salim Muftić at the European Muslim Congress points in a different direction. Muftić states that Bosnian Muslims "remain in a perfect communion of thought and feeling with all of their coreligionists in the Orient as well as the Occident, and in good fortune as well as in plight."¹⁵ This points to the possibility that the creation of a global umma was in itself a goal of Shakīb Arslan, independently from any good that may be derived from it. The construction of Shakīb Arslan's network, to the extent that it was principally an Islamic network, was not only justified by its impact upon the Islamic world, but by its very existence.

Notes

- 1 William L. Cleveland, *Islam Against the West: Shakib Arslan and the Campaign for Islamic Nationalism* (Austin, TX: University of Texas, 1985), xxi.
- 2 These include Juliette Bessis, "Chékib Arslan et les mouvements nationalistes au Maghreb," *Revue historique* 526 (1978): 467–489; Cleveland, *Islam Against the West, passim*; Axel Havemann, "Between Ottoman Loyalty and Arab 'Independence': Muhammad Kurd 'Alī, Ğirġi Zaydān, and Šakīb Arslān," *Quaderni di Studi Arabi* 5–6 (1987–1988): 347–356; Martin Kramer, *Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival: The Politics of Ideas in the Middle East* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1996); and Marie-Renée Mouton, "Le congrès syrio-palestinien de Genève (1921)," *Relations internationales* 19 (Fall 1979): 313–328.
- 3 For the index of proper names and journal titles in *La Nation Arabe*, see Raja Adal, *La Nation Arabe: Contents and Index* (Tokyo: Islamic Area Studies, 2002).
- 4 From Sharabasi's interview with Salima Arslan in 1954. Aḥmad Šarabāšī, *Amīr al-bayān Šakīb Arslān* (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-'arabi, 1963), 125–126.
- 5 Reprint, *La Nation Arabe* (England: Archive Editions, 1988).
- 6 Chekib Arslan, "A propos de l'Éthiopie: La situation des Musulmans de ce pays. Document écrasant," *La Nation Arabe* 6/12–13 (September–November 1936): 691–692.
- 7 Hasan Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), 116–143, 211.
- 8 Chekib Arslan, "Sur le Bolchevisme: L'Éternelle légende de l'influence bolcheviste sur le réveil national du monde musulman," *La Nation Arabe* 3/10–12 (October–December 1932): 29–30. Translation mine.
- 9 Chekib Arslan, "La mort du Patriarche maronite," *La Nation Arabe* 2/10–11 (November–December): 53–54.

- 10 Chekib Arslan, "La mort de Kémal Ataturk," *La Nation Arabe* 8/20–21 (September–December 1938): 1081. Translation mine.
- 11 Yamauchi Masayuki, *Nattoku shinakatta otoko: Enver Pasha, Chū Tō kara Chūō Ajia he* [Enver Pasha, the Unsatisfied Man: from the Middle East to Central Asia] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shōten, 1999), 69, 284–288.
- 12 *Ibid.*, 69, 292.
- 13 Letter from Shakib Arslan to Enver Paşa, March 11, 1921, cited in Yamauchi, *Nattoku shinakatta otoko* 326.
- 14 Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 3.
- 15 Mouton, "Le congrès syro-palestinien de Genève (1921)," 321, 322.
- 16 Philip S. Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920–1945* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1987), 231.
- 17 Chekib Arslan, "La « Nation Arabe » privée pour le moment de la collaboration de notre cher collègue M. Djabri," *La Nation Arabe* 8/16–17 (January–April 1938): 910.
- 18 Mouton, "Le congrès syro-palestinien de Genève (1921)," 315 n. 7.
- 19 Ihsan el-Djabri, "La Syrie du 8 mars au 26 juillet 1920," *La Nation Arabe* 1 [2] (April 1930): 82 n. 1. It was not Riyad al-Sulh himself, as writes Mouton, but his father Riza who was minister of the Interior in Faisal's cabinet.
- 20 Cleveland, *Islam Against the West*, 49.
- 21 Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, 222.
- 22 *Ibid.*, 222, 227.
- 23 Chekib Arslan, "L'Armée Rouge: instrument de la Révolution Mondiale. Le monde civilisé en danger," *La Nation Arabe* 5/4 (March–April 1935): 281.
- 24 David Ben Gurion, *My Talks with Arab Leaders*, ed. Misha Louvish, trans. Aryeh Rubinstein and Misha Louvish (New York: The Third Press, 1973 [1967]), 28, 33. The meeting is described by al-Jabiri in Ihsan el-Djabri, *La Nation Arabe* (November–December, 1934): 144–146; and by Ben Gurion in his *My Talks with Arab Leaders*, 35–40.
- 25 Kramer, *Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival*, 109.
- 26 Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, 227–240.
- 27 *Ibid.*, 240.
- 28 Arslan writes that the 1925–1926 treaty draft differed almost in nothing other than details from the Franco-Syrian treaty signed in October 1936. Chekib Arslan, "Le traité franco-syrien," *La Nation Arabe* 6/12–13 (September–November 1936): 642.
- 29 *Ibid.*, 642–643.
- 30 Chekib Arslan, "Il y a, paraît-il, un comité franco-musulman.: Toujours l'Afrique du Nord," *La Nation Arabe* 5/2 (November–December 1934): 133–134.
- 31 In "Factionalism among Syrian nationalists during the French mandate," Khoury depends on an unpublished manuscript by Edmond Rabbath, a student in Paris at the time of the Arslan-de Jouvenel meeting. This document describes the November 1925 meeting, during which Arslan's moderation successfully impressed the French High Commissioner de Jouvenel, who asked for more time to work out an accord. Although Khoury does not mention the second meeting in 1926, *La Nation Arabe* sheds light on its three working sessions, and on Arslan's conclusion as to why the talks failed. Chekib Arslan, "Le traité franco-syrien," 641–648; and by the same author, "Le départ de M. Ponsot," *La Nation Arabe* 4/7–9 (July–September 1933): 37–38. Arslan's version of events is partly confirmed by the French socialist Robert-Jean Longuet's article in *Clarté* of March 1938, reproduced in Robert-Jean Longuet, "A propos de la Syrie," *La Nation Arabe* 8/16–17 (January–April 1938): 891–897; by E. Lévi-Provençal, "L'Émir Shakib Arslan," *Cahiers de l'Orient contemporain* 9–10 (1st and 2nd trimesters, 1947), 5–19; and by Meir Zamir in his *The Formation of Modern Lebanon* (Ithaca, IL: Cornell University Press, 1985), 198.

- 32 Bureau politique, Etat-major, theatre d'operations de l'Afrique du Nord, *Contribution à l'étude de l'activité politique de l'émir Chekib Arslan*, 29H35 (Aix-en-Provence, 1940), 28–29. Despite his conciliatory tone regarding the treaty, Arslan seems to have had serious reservations, both about drawing the frontiers of Greater Lebanon without a plebiscite and about abandoning Iskanderun to Turkey. See Chekib Arslan, “Le traité franco-syrien,” 645; and by the same author, “L’ennemi de la France que je suis?” *La Nation Arabe* 8/16–17 (January–April, 1938): 801–802.
- 33 Cleveland, *Islam Against the West*, 86.
- 34 *Ibid.*, 69.
- 35 “Arslan, Shakib,” in Reeva S. Simon, Philip Mattar, and Richard W. Bulliet, eds, *Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Macmillan, 1996), 37–39. The same definition appears in David Commins, *Historical Dictionary of Syria* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 1996), 37–39.
- 36 Kramer, *Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival*, 7.
- 37 Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983): 67–95.
- 38 Cleveland, *Islam Against the West*, 11.
- 39 Translation from Arabic is mine.
- 40 Chekib Arslan, “L’ennemi de la France que je suis?,” 809.
- 41 Chekib Arslan, “La mort de l’orientaliste italien Nalino,” *La Nation Arabe* 8/20–21 (September–December 1938): 1192–1193.
- 42 R. L. Melka, “Max Freiherr von Oppenheim: Sixty Years of Scholarship and Political Intrigue in the Middle East,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 1973/1: 81.
- 43 Ministère Public Fédéral Suisse, “Procès-verbal d’audition,” Doc. C10.7 E 4320 (B) 1984/29 vol. 13 (Geneva, October 6, 1938), 3.
- 44 Chekib Arslan, “Qu’est-ce que vous voulez qu’un homme d’Etat français dise de Guillaume II ?,” *La Nation Arabe* 5/4 (March–April 1935): 249. Translation mine.
- 45 *Ibid.*, 254.
- 46 Widmer, “Emir Shakib Arslan,” *Die Welt des Islams* 19 (1937): 7.
- 47 Chekib Arslan, “La grammaire arabe est la grammaire la plus classique et la plus parfaite,” *La Nation Arabe* 5/3 (January–February 1935): 194.
- 48 Widmer, “Emir Shakib Arslan.” For Arslan’s reaction to Widmer’s article see Chekib Arslan, “Notre dette de reconnaissance à l’honorable Pasteur M. Widmer, de Berne,” *La Nation Arabe* 8/16–17 (January–April 1938): 898.
- 49 Widmer, “Emir Shakib Arslan,” 3–4.
- 50 Georg Kampffmeyer, review of *Hādīr al-‘ālam al-islāmī*, by Lothrop Stoddard and annotated by Shakib Arslan, *Die Welt des Islams* 15 (1933): 117–119. Translation mine.
- 51 Chekib Arslan, “Les Hittites ne sont pas turcs et les Turcs ne sont pas hittites,” *La Nation Arabe* 7/14–15 (January–April 1937): 780.
- 52 Melka, “Max Freiherr von Oppenheim,” 81–93.
- 53 *Ibid.*, 86.
- 54 Bureau Politique, “Contribution à l’étude de l’activité politique de l’émir Chekib Arslan,” 47.
- 55 Melka, “Max Freiherr von Oppenheim.”
- 56 British Foreign Office, “Letter from R. Graham of the British Embassy in Rome to the Earl of Balfour,” June 5, 1922, in A. L. P. Burdett, ed., *Arab Dissident Movements, volume 2: 1905–1920* (England: Archive Editions, 1996), 101.
- 57 Chekib Arslan, “Les atrocités italiennes fascistes en Tripolitaine,” *La Nation Arabe* 2/10–11 (November–December 1931): 47.
- 58 Chekib Arslan, “Pour supprimer le nomadisme, il n’est pas nécessaire de déposséder la population,” *La Nation Arabe* 3/3–4 (March–April 1932): 50.

- 59 Chekib Arslan, "Omar Moukhtar," *La Nation Arabe* 2/8–9 (September–October 1931): 5–6. Translation mine.
- 60 "Urkunden: Der Muslimische Kongreß von Europa," *Die Welt des Islams* 17/3–4 (1935): 101.
- 61 Chekib Arslan, "Le problème éthiopien," *La Nation Arabe* 6/8–9 (January–April 1936): 514–515. Translation mine.
- 62 Chekib Arslan, "Le conflit italo-éthiopien et les arabes [*sic*]: Les musulmans d'Abysinie," *La Nation Arabe* 5/5 (May–June 1935): 309–310.
- 63 Chekib Arslan, "Qu'est-ce que vous voulez qu'un homme d'Etat français dise de Guillaume II ?," *La Nation Arabe* 5/4 (March–April 1935): 253.
- 64 The polemic begins with a short introduction by Arslan in Chekib Arslan, "La vérité sur la situation des Musulmans en Bulgarie," *La Nation Arabe* 3/10–12 (October–December 1932): 10–12; this is followed by the argument of Džemalović in Smail Aga Djemalovič, "Les Musulmans en Bulgarie," *La Nation Arabe* 3/10–12 (October–December 1932): 12–20; the answer by Girard can be found in André Girard, "La situation des Musulmans en Bulgarie," *La Nation Arabe* 4/1–3 (January–March 1933): 39–46; finally comes a counter-reply by Džemalović in Smail Aga Dchemalovič, "Les musulmans en Bulgarie," *La Nation Arabe* 4/4–6 (April–June 1933): 38–44.
- 65 Among European journals, other than *La Nation Arabe*, and the reports of Christian missionaries, Popovic mentions *Oriente Moderno*, which tracked information appearing in the Turkish and Arab press. For further information on the controversy between Džemalović and Girard, see Alexandre Popovic, *L'Islam balkanique: Les musulmans du sud-est européen dans la période post-ottomane* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1986), 82–85.
- 66 Bureau Politique, "Contribution à l'étude de l'activité politique de l'émir Chekib Arslan," 18. György Lederer, "Sur l'islam à Budapest," in Stéphane A. Dudoignon and Catherine Servan-Schreiber, eds, *La transmission du savoir dans le monde musulman périphérique* (Istanbul: Isis, forthcoming), 469.
- 67 Popovic, *L'Islam balkanique*, 191.
- 68 Chekib Arslan, "Le Congrès Musulman d'Europe," *La Nation Arabe* 6/10–11 (October–November 1935): 417–424.
- 69 "Urkunden: Der Muslimische Kongreß von Europa," 104. Translation mine.
- 70 I. Takacs, "Szynkiewicz, Jakub," in Marc Gaborieau, Nicole Grandin, Pierre Labrousse, and Alexandre Popovic, eds, *Dictionnaire biographique des savants et grandes figures du monde musulman périphérique, du XIX^e siècle à nos jours*, 1 (Paris: CNRS -EHESS, 1992): 55.
- 71 Chekib Arslan, "Une mosquée à Varsovie," *La Nation Arabe* 5/5 (May–June 1935): 334.
- 72 Chekib Arslan, "Pertes très douloureuses," *La Nation Arabe* 8/18–19 (May–August 1938): 1028; by the same author, "Le Congrès Musulman d'Europe," *La Nation Arabe* 5/7 (October–November 1935): 418–424. Alexandre Popovic, "Muftić, Salim," in Marc Gaborieau *et al.*, eds, *Dictionnaire biographique*, 2: 67.
- 73 "Adā' al-amīr shakīb li-farīdat al-ḥağğ," *Al-Manār* 30/2 (July 8, 1929): 160.
- 74 Chekib Arslan, "L'Alliance des trois pays arabes indépendants: L'Etat Seoudite, le Yemen et l'Irak," *La Nation Arabe* 6/8–9 (January–April 1936): 469.
- 75 Ibid.
- 76 Ibid., 470–471.
- 77 Chekib Arslan, "La paix fraternelle entre les deux souverains arabes," *La Nation Arabe* 5/1 (September–October 1934): 40–47.
- 78 "Adā' al-amīr shakīb li-farīdat al-ḥağğ," 159.
- 79 These bulletins were intercepted by the British services, who transferred them on to the French. Bureau Politique, "Contribution à l'étude de l'activité politique de l'émir Chekib Arslan," 51.

- 80 See John P. Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation: The Origins and Rise of Moroccan Nationalism, 1912–1944* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1967); Ali Merad, *Le réformisme musulman en Algérie de 1925 à 1940. Essai d'histoire religieuse et sociale* (Paris: Mouton & Co, 1967).
- 81 A copy of the Dahir may be found in Halstead, 276–277.
- 82 *Ibid.*, 184–186.
- 83 Charles-André Julien, *L'Afrique du Nord en marche: Nationalismes musulmans et souveraineté française* (Paris: René Julliard, 1972), 133.
- 84 See the first article by Arslan on the Berber Dahir published in two parts as “Tribunaux Berbères,” *La Nation Arabe* 1/6–7 (August–September 1930): 22–28 and *La Nation Arabe* 1/8 (October 1930): 5–7.
- 85 For the nationalist response to the Berber Dahir see Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation*, 181–186. For a translation of the text of the resolution, see Chekib Arslan, “Résolution concernant la désislamisation des Berbères,” *La Nation Arabe* 3/5–6 (May–June 1932): 33–34.
- 86 Roger Le Tourneau, *Evolution politique de l'Afrique du Nord musulmane, 1920–1961* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1962), 185. Translation mine.
- 87 For Arslan's comments on the new Dahir, see Chekib Arslan, “Et le fameux Dahir berbère?” *La Nation Arabe* 5/4 (September–October 1934): 63–66.
- 88 Julien, *L'Afrique du Nord en marche*, 151.
- 89 For two articles on the history of Arabs in Spain and Southern France, see Chekib Arslan, “A la recherche des vestiges de la civilisation arabe en Espagne,” *La Nation Arabe* 1/5 (July 1930): 193–200; and “A la recherche des vestiges arabes en Espagne et dans le Midi de la France,” *La Nation Arabe* 2/3 (Mars 1931): 19–31.
- 90 Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation*, 165.
- 91 *Ibid.*, 129. From Halstead's interviews with 'Umar 'Abd al-Jalil, Mahdi Bennuna, and Muhammad al-Fasi in 1959.
- 92 Ministère Public Federal Suisse, “Procès-verbal d'audition,” Doc. C10.7 E 4320 (B) 1984/29 vol. 13 (Geneva, October 14, 1938), 2.
- 93 Bureau Politique, “Contribution à l'étude de l'activité politique de l'émir Chekib Arslan,” 13.
- 94 Chekib Arslan, “Une Campagne de mensonge,” *La Nation Arabe* 2/ 8–9 (September–October 1931): 36.
- 95 Chekib Arslan, “Une perte très douloureuse: la mort de Hadje Abdessalam Bennouna,” *La Nation Arabe* 5/3 (January–February 1935): 209–210.
- 96 Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation*, 129. From Halstead's interview with Mohamed Hassan al-Ouezzani in 1959.
- 97 *Ibid.*, 238. From Halstead's interview with Ahmed Mekouar in 1963.
- 98 *Ibid.*, 486; for the special issue devoted to Arslan, see Habib Bourguiba, “Un vétéran de la lutte anti-coloniale: l'Emir Chekib Arslan,” *L'Action tunisienne*, June 3, 1937.
- 99 Julien, *L'Afrique du Nord en marche*, 108.
- 100 Le Tourneau, *Évolution politique*, 327.
- 101 Julien, 109; for Arslan's opinion on Messali al-Haj, see Chekib Arslan, *La Nation Arabe* (January–April, 1937): 782–784.
- 102 Merad, *Le réformisme musulman en Algérie*, 365. Translation mine.
- 103 Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation*, 127. Halstead's conclusion comes from personal interviews with Messaoud Chiguer, Ibrahim al-Kattani, Mohammed Lyazidi, and Mohamed Hassan al-Ouezzani in 1959.
- 104 Cleveland's work is the first to portray Arslan as an Islamic revivalist as much as an Arab nationalist. Le Tourneau characterizes Arslan as an “apostle of nationalism,” and Halstead writes of Arslan as a “‘secular’ Arab nationalist.” Le Tourneau, *Evolution Politique*, 71; Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation*, 127.

- 105 For the controversy between Arslan and Baruni, see Merad, *Le réformisme musulman en Algérie*, 370. Arslan also advocated a more limited form of Arab union in the pages of *La Nation Arabe*. For example, see Chekib Arslan, “Ils prennent leurs désirs pour des réalités: dissertation d’un Général français sur le Panislamisme et le Panarabisme,” *La Nation Arabe* 8/18–19 (May–August 1938): 925–946.
- 106 Chekib Arslan, “La disparition d’une des plus grandes figures de l’Islam Rachid Ridha,” *La Nation Arabe* 5/7 (October–November 1935): 448.
- 107 Lūṭrūb Studard, *Ḥādīr al- ‘ālam al-islāmī*, trans. ‘Aḡāḡ Nuwayhīd, comp. Shakīb Arslān, 4 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-fikr 1971), 1–2: 298. This is the Arabic translation of Lothrop Stoddard’s *The New World of Islam* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1922). It is so extensively annotated by Shakīb Arslan that it became several times the size of the English original, and one of Arslan’s major works.
- 108 See Cleveland, *Islam Against the West*; Kramer, *Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival*.
- 109 Chekib Arslan, “La disparition d’une des plus grandes figures de l’Islam Rachid Ridha,” *La Nation Arabe* 5/7 (October–November 1935): 448. The other was ‘Abd al-Qadir Kabbani, a notable from Beirut.
- 110 Arslan’s permission to stop in Egypt was only obtained after a special intervention before Hafiz Afifi, the Egyptian foreign minister and friend of Arslan from before his move to Europe. “Adā’ al-amīr Šakīb li-farīdat al-ḥaḡḡ,” 157. On Arslan’s exclusion from Egypt, Cleveland explains that “King Fu’ad was not anxious to ease the passage of a notorious associate of ‘Abbas Hilmi to the state of Ibn Saud.” Cleveland, *Islam Against the West*, 73.
- 111 Chekib Arslan, “La disparition d’une des plus grandes figures de l’Islam Rachid Ridha,” 450. Translation mine.
- 112 Chekib Arslan, “Le plus grand deuil des lettres arabes contemporaines,” *La Nation Arabe* 3/7–9 (July–September 1932): 51–52.
- 113 *Ibid.*, 52. Translation mine.
- 114 *Ibid.*
- 115 Chekib Arslan, “Le Congrès Musulman d’Europe,” *La Nation Arabe* 5/7 (October–November 1935): 418.